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 Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem
 DAVID AUSTEN-SMITH and JEFFREY S. BANKS University of Rochester
 he Condorcet Jury Theorem states that majorities are more likely than any single individual to select the
 ' "better" of two alternatives when there exists uncertainty about which of the two alternatives is in fact
 L preferred. Most extant proofs of this theorem implicitly make the behavioral assumption that individuals
 vote "sincerely" in the collective decision making, a seemingly innocuous assumption, given that individuals are
 taken to possess a common preference for selecting the better alternative. However, in the model analyzed here
 we find that sincere behavior by all individuals is not rational even when individuals have such a common
 preference. In particular, sincere voting does not constitute a Nash equilibrium. A satisfactory rational choice
 foundation for the claim that majorities invariably "do better" than individuals, therefore, has yet to be derived.
 A although never achieving the notoriety of his dis-
 covery that majority voting can be cyclic, the Jury
 Theorem proposed by Condorcet ([1785] 1994)
 has received periodic attention and in the last decade
 been the subject of substantial interest and analysis.
 Loosely speaking, the theorem is as follows. Suppose
 there are two mutually exclusive alternatives, {A, B},
 such that one of these alternatives is unequivocally
 better for all of n individuals in a group but the identity
 of the better alternative (i.e., A or B) is unknown.
 Suppose further that for all individuals i E N = { 1, ....
 n }, the probability that i votes for the better alternative
 isp > 1/2 and is independent of the probability that any
 j * i votes for the better alternative. Then the Jury
 Theorem states that the probability that a majority votes
 for the better alternative exceedsp and approaches 1 as
 n goes to infinity (Black 1958, 164-65; McLean and
 Hewitt 1994, 34-40). Given this, the Jury Theorem has
 been used as a positive argument for decision making by
 majority rule: Majorities are more likely to select the
 ''correct" alternative than any single individual when
 there is uncertainty about which alternative is in fact the
 best (e.g., Berg 1993; Ladha 1992, 1993; Grofman and
 Feld 1988; Miller 1986; Nitzan and Paroush 1985; Par-
 oush 1994; Young 1988).
 The proofs of the Jury Theorem and subsequent
 extensions are entirely statistical in nature (see Berg
 1993; Ladha 1992, 1993; Nitzan and Paroush 1985).
 Specifically, they take the individual probabilities of
 correct decisions parametrically and then aggregate
 them in a particular way. An important-but largely
 implicit-assumption of such proofs then is that an
 individual deciding which of the two outcomes to select
 when voting as a member of a collective (or jury)
 behaves in exactly the same manner as when that
 individual alone selects the outcome. Alternatively (to
 use the language of voting theory), individuals are taken
 to vote "sincerely." This implicit behavioral assumption
 is seen in the use of the same probability terms in the
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 aggregation to generate both the likelihood that a
 majority chooses correctly and the likelihood that any
 one individual chooses correctly.
 Our purpose here is to bring the "sincerity" assump-
 tion into the light and determine its relevance for the
 Jury Theorem. One intuition is that the assumption of
 sincere voting is innocuous. After all, every individual in
 the collective has the same fundamental preferences
 over the given binary agenda in that all want to choose
 the "correct" alternative. Consequently, there is neither
 incentive nor opportunity for any individual to manipu-
 late the collective decision to their particular advantage
 at the expense of others. We show, however, that this
 intuition is mistaken. The argument is illustrated by the
 following example.
 Consider a group of three individuals, all of whom
 share identical preferences over two alternatives, {A,
 B }, conditional on knowing the true "state of the
 world." There is, however, uncertainty about the true
 state of the world, which may (without ambiguity) be
 either state A or state B. In state A (B), individuals each
 receive a payoff of 1 if alternative A (B) is chosen
 and receive a payoff of 0 otherwise. There is a common
 prior probability that the true state isA. Individuals have
 private information about the true state of the world.
 Specifically, prior to any decision on which alternative to
 choose, each individual i privately observes a signal, s1 =
 0 or si = 1, about the true state: if the true state is A,
 then it is more likely that the received signal is 0; and if
 the true state is B, then it is more likely that the received
 signal is 1. Once each individual has received his or her
 signal, the group chooses an alternative by majority vote
 (with no abstention). Three sorts of voting behavior are
 of particular interest: sincere voting, in which each indi-
 vidual selects the alternative yielding his or her highest
 expected payoff conditional on their signal; informative
 voting, in which each individual i votes for A if and only
 if receiving a signal si = 0; and rational voting, in which
 individuals' decision rules constitute a Nash equilibrium
 (i.e., given everyone else's rule, each individual votes to
 maximize the expected payoff). To complete the exam-
 ple, we make two assumptions on individuals' beliefs:
 (1) sincere voting is informative in that on receiving a
 signal of 0 (1) an individual thinks A (B) is the true
 state; and (2) the common prior belief that the true state
 is A is sufficiently strong that if any individual i were to
 observe all three individuals' signals, then i believes B is
 the true state only if all the available evidence supports
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 the true state being B (i.e., s, = 52 = s3 = 1). Then
 despite it being common knowledge that individuals'
 preferences before receiving any private information are
 in fact identical, in this example sincere voting by all
 individuals is not rational.
 To see why sincere voting is not rational here, con-
 sider any individual i and assume that the remaining
 individuals, say j and k, vote sincerely. By assumption
 (1), j and k are voting informatively, in which case
 individual i must be in one of three possible situations:
 Either (a) j and k have both observed a 0 and vote forA,
 (b) j and k have both observed a 1 and vote for B, or
 (c) j and k have observed different signal-values and vote
 for different alternatives. Under (a) or (b) the outcome
 is independent of i's vote, and if (c) obtains, i's vote is
 decisive. Consequently, the difference in i's expected
 payoffs from voting for A versus voting for B depends
 entirely on what i does conditional on situation (c).
 However, if the situation is (c), then i infers that exactly
 one of the remaining individuals (it does not matter
 which) has observed a signal of 0 in which case, by
 assumption (2), i has an unequivocally best decision:
 vote forA irrespective of the value of i's signal. Hence all
 individuals voting sincerely cannot be a Nash equilib-
 rium.
 Before going on to the general formal analysis, it is
 worth emphasizing two points. The first point is that
 when any one individual votes "insincerely," she is in
 fact acting in everyone's best interest (given the common
 ex post preferences) and not just her own. Thus the
 distinction between sincere and rational voting when
 there are only two alternatives derives entirely from the
 information-based heterogeneity of individuals' prefer-
 ences consequent on receiving their private information
 (interim preferences), in that the existence of such
 heterogeneity allows for valuable information to be
 inferred in equilibrium.
 The second point is that the result that, in general,
 sincere and informative voting by all individuals cannot
 be a Nash equilibrium does not say that sincere or
 informative voting by any one individual is inconsistent
 with Nash equilibrium. Further, there may be equilibria
 in which some vote sincerely and others do not and
 where the resulting majority-rule outcome improves on
 individual decision making. Our goal here, however, is
 less ambitious than that of identifying all Nash equilibria
 of certain games, determining which generate better
 outcomes compared with individual decision making and
 which do not. Rather, we simply demonstrate that while
 the canonical statement and proofs of the Condorcet
 Jury Theorems are correct as they stand given the
 additional assumption that all individuals vote sincerely
 and informatively, such an assumption is inconsistent
 with a game-theoretic view of collective behavior. A
 satisfactory rational choice foundation for the claim that
 majorities invariably "do better" than individuals, there-
 fore, has yet to be derived.'
 We shall develop the basic framework, essentially
 elaborating on the setup underlying this example. Sub-
 1 But see Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1995 and Myerson 1994 for large
 population results.
 sequently, we consider two extensions of the basic model
 to explore the robustness of the main result (i.e., that
 sincere voting by all individuals cannot generally be both
 informative and rational) to variations in the structure of
 individuals' information. Finally, we shall consider some
 implications of the results.
 THE BASIC MODEL
 One of the difficulties with previous work on the Jury
 Theorem is that from a behavioral perspective much
 of the analysis essentially "starts in the middle" of an
 information accumulation and aggregation process. The
 individual likelihoods of making correct decisions are
 often described as posterior probabilities, implying the
 existence of a prior belief, as well as some observed
 event statistically related to the true best alternative
 (e.g., Ladha 1992). In contrast, we describe in detail a
 model of prior beliefs and events that permits identifying
 optimal individual behavior. And because we wish the
 model to fall within the domain of problems to which
 previous work on the Jury Theorem speaks, it is con-
 strained to generating a "middle" or interim stage
 consistent with the features of existing research on the
 Jury Theorem (e.g., individual probabilities of correct
 decisions, correlations between such probabilities).
 There is a pair of alternatives {A, B } and two possible
 states of the world; without ambiguity, we also label the
 states {A, B}. There is a set N = {1, ... , n} of
 individuals; assume n is odd and n - 5. Individuals have
 identical preferences over alternatives and states of the
 world, represented by
 Vi E N. ui(A, A) = ui(B, B) = 1 and
 ui(A, B) = ui(B, A) = 0, (1)
 where the first argument of ui describes the alternative
 selected and the second describes the state. Hence, all
 individuals prefer to select alternative A when the state
 is A, and alternative B when the state is B.2
 The true state of the world is unknown to the individ-
 uals; let Ir E (0, 1) denote the common prior probability
 that the true state isA. Before any decision is made over
 {A, B }, individual i E N receives a private signal, si E
 { 0, 1 }, about the true state of the world. Individuals'
 signals are independent draws from a state-dependent
 distribution satisfying
 Pr[si = 0IA] = qa E (1/2, 1) and
 Pr[si = 1 IB] = qb E (1/2, 1). (2)
 2 The imposition of symmetry on the payoffs for making the "wrong"
 decision is an expository convenience only. If, as Condorcet assumed,
 ui(A, B) * ui(B, A), then some of the definitions to follow need to be
 modified in obvious ways, and the algebra supporting the results
 becomes correspondingly messier (McLean and Hewitt 1994). The
 qualitative results themselves, however, are unaffected by the symme-
 try assumption. To see this, recall the first example presented. Here,
 the intuition behind (general) sincere voting not being rational is
 independent of the payoffs. The key thing is that sincere voting is
 informative. With asymmetric payoffs, the condition governing when
 sincere voting is also informative will be modified, but that is all.
 35
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 That is, if the true state of the world isA, then it is more
 likely that a signal of si = 0 will be observed, whereas if
 the true state is B, it is more likely that si = 1 will be
 observed. We refer to this description of preferences and
 information collectively as model I.
 After observing her signal, each individual votes for
 either alternative A or B. Thus a voting strategy for
 individual i is a map vi:{0, 1} -- {A, B} describing
 which of the two alternatives i votes for as a function of
 her information. Let v: {O, 1 } n- {A, B }n defined by
 v(s) = (v1(sJ), ..., vn(sn)) denote a voting profile.3
 Based on her signal, an individual can update her prior
 belief of wT and determine which of the two alternatives
 would provide the higher expected utility if she alone
 were making the decision. In particular, from relation-
 ship 1, the expected utility of the alternative A being
 chosen, given the signal si, is simply the probability that
 the true state isA, and similarly for B. Employing Bayes'
 Rule and relationship 2, these probabilities are given by
 Pr(A Isi = 0) = + Tqa
 ,rrqa + (1 - rr)(l - qb)
 Pr(Bjsj = 0) =rq + (1 - r)(1 - qb)
 Pr(Bjsj = 1) = (l -qa) + (1 - rq )qb
 Pr(Ajsi = 1) = - ) +(1 - qa)
 rr(l1 qa) + (1 - ar)qbj
 Therefore we have that
 E[ui(A, * ).si = 0] > E[ui(B, )Isi = 0]
 <-- aqa > (1 - -,)(1 -qb) (3)
 E[ui(B, - ).si = 1] > E[ui(A, - ).si = 1]
 <-- (1 - 7T)qb > W(1 qa)- (4)
 DEFINITION. A voting strategy vi is sincere if vi(s) = A (B)
 if and only if
 E[ui(A, * ) |sj] > ( <) E[ui(B, * ) lSJ *4
 Note that we can evaluate the individuals' preferences
 over the choices of alternative A and B at various
 hypothetical stages in the process, where these stages
 differ according to the information possessed by the
 individuals. For example, at the ex ante stage, before
 they have received their private signals, individuals have
 identical beliefs, as characterized by the prior nr, and
 hence identical preferences over A and B. Similarly, at
 some ex post stage, where either the state is known with
 certainty or else remains unknown but where all of the
 private signals have been revealed, individuals again
 3 Throughout, we will say that a voting profile satisfies a certain
 property if each of its individual components satisfies the property.
 4 We ignore instances where (ir, qa, qb) are such that individuals are
 indifferent between choosing A and B, since these are (in a certain
 well-defined sense) not typical. Similarly, all inequalities below implic-
 itly involving (-ir, qa, qb) will be taken to be strict.
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 have identical preferences. On the other hand, at the
 interim stage, where individuals possess their private
 information but only their private information (and
 where this is the stage when actual decisions are made),
 preferences over the choice of A or B can diverge; that
 is, some individuals may now prefer alternative A,
 whereas others may prefer B (this difference of course
 emanating from their private signals). Thus we have
 heterogeneous policy preferences being generated en-
 dogenously within the model. Furthermore, the fact that
 this heterogeneity is information-based will play an im-
 portant role in our results.
 Second, note that if the prior IT is sufficiently high
 relative to qa and qb, then sincere voting would prescribe
 choosing alternative A regardless of the signal observed;
 and similarly, a choice for B if nT is sufficiently small.
 Under either of these circumstances it is clear that if
 individuals vote sincerely they will all vote for the same
 alternative, implying the probability of a correct majority
 decision will be exactly the same as the probability that
 any one individual chooses correctly. Hence, the Jury
 Theorem will not hold. In the present context, that is,
 the Condorcet Jury Theorem assumes not only that
 voting is sincere but also that sincere voting is informa-
 tive.
 DEFINITION. A voting strategy vi is informative if vi(O) = A
 and vi(l) = B.
 Thus when all individuals adopt informative strategies
 all of their private information is revealed through their
 voting decisions.5
 While recent extensions of the Condorcet Jury Theo-
 rem speak only to certain characteristics of majority rule,
 we wish to allow for other types of rules as well. Define
 an aggregation rule to be a map f: {A, B}n -> {A, B}
 describing the outcome of the process as a function of
 the individuals' votes. We restrict attention here to
 aggregation rules that are anonymous (i.e., that treat all
 individuals the same) and monotonic (if B is chosen
 when it receives k votes, then it is also chosen when it
 receives more than k votes). For any such aggregation
 rule f, we can define a nonnegative integer kf such that
 B is the outcome if and only if B receives more than kf
 votes.6 For example, the majority voting aggregation rule
 is given by kf = (n - 1)/2.
 Given an aggregation rule f, we now have a well-
 defined Bayesian game B(f) in which N is the set of
 players, {A, B } is the action set for each i E N, { 0, 1}
 is the set of "types" each individual can be, the appro-
 priate probabilities over "types" and utilities over vec-
 tors of actions, are induced from relationships 1 and 2
 and f, and this structure is taken to be common knowl-
 edge among the participants (see appendix).
 5Of course, such information is also revealed when another strategy is
 played: vi(O) = B and v,(1) = A. However, it is easily shown that this
 "contrary" strategy is weakly dominated.
 6 Note that this is exactly the class of rules considered by Condorcet,
 who, in the explicitly jury context, suggests that a defendant be
 convicted if and only if the number of votes for conviction exceeds
 some critical number depending, in general, on the parameters of the
 situation (McLean and Hewitt 1994).
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 DEFINITION. A voting profile is rational in model I if it con-
 stitutes a Nash equilibrium of the Bayesian game B(f).
 It is worth emphasizing that, unlike the definitions of
 sincere and informative voting, rationality is a property
 of voting profiles and not of individual voting strategies.
 The most important feature of Nash equilibrium
 voting in this environment is that there is, in principle,
 information about other individuals' private signals that
 can be incorporated into the decision to select alterna-
 tive A or alternative B. This additional information
 comes about as follows: in computing whether A or B is
 the better response to other individuals' voting strate-
 gies, individual i only concerns herself with those situa-
 tions where she is "pivotal"-that is, where her vote
 makes a difference in the collective choice, where here a
 situation is a particular list of the others' private infor-
 mation. Suppose, for example, that all other individuals
 were adopting the informative strategy described above
 and collective decision making is by majority rule. In
 those situations where at least n/2 of the others have
 observed is, i's vote is immaterial, because regardless of
 how she votes a majority will vote for B-and similarly
 for those situations where at least n/2 of the others have
 observed Os. Therefore the only instance in which i's
 vote matters is when exactly (n - 1)/2 of the other
 individuals have observed is (and hence (n - 1)/2 have
 observed Os). But then in making her voting decision, i
 can essentially presume that exactly (n - 1)/2 of the
 others have observed is, thereby generating this addi-
 tional "equilibrium" information (see Austen-Smith
 1990; Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1994). This argument
 is made precise in the appendix.
 Finally, for any vector of signals
 S = (Si, . ,Sn), let k(s) =Esi.
 N
 Just as in the determination of i's sincere voting strategy,
 we can compute via Bayes' Rule the probability that the
 true state is either A or B-and hence the expected
 utility from alternative A or B being chosen, conditional
 on the vector s:
 E[ui(A, * )Is] > E[ui(B, * )Is] iff
 1 rr> [qbl(l - qa)]() - qb)lqalnks (5)
 and
 E[ui(A, * )Is] < E[ui(B, * )Is] iff
 ~~< [qbl(l - qa)] [( - qb)lqa] (6)
 Of course, since all individuals have the same prefer-
 ences, relationships 5 and 6 give the optimal decision for
 any individual given all of the available information
 about the true state-and hence for the collective as a
 whole.
 Because
 k(s) =E ,
 N
 relationship 2 implies that the greater is k(s), the more
 likely it is that the true state is B and the less likely it is
 that the true state is A. Suppose equation 5 holds when
 k(s) = 0 and suppose relationship 6 holds when k(s) =
 n. Then there must exist some critical value of k(s), say
 k*, such that k(s) ? k* implies E[ui(A, -)Is] >
 E[ui(B, * )Is], and k(s) > k* implies E[ui(A, * )Is] <
 E[ui(B, * )Is]. Then, k* is defined implicitly by:
 [qbl(l - qa) ]k*[(l - qb)lqa] -k-
 [q~/(l - k-( ] k
 > 1 > [qb(l - qa - qb)/qa] , (7)
 where the dependence of k* on (qa, qb, rr) is under-
 stood. In general, then, k * describes the optimal method
 of aggregating individuals' private information (if this
 information were known) in that the group unanimously
 prefers the collective decision to be A, rather than B at
 s if and only if k(s) ? k*. Of course, k* may not exist for
 all parameterizations. In particular, if relationship 5
 holds at k(s) = n, then all individuals would prefer A
 over B irrespective of the vector of signals s-and
 conversely if relationship 6 holds at k(s) = 0. To avoid
 such trivialities, hereafter assume the parameters (qa,
 qb, r) are such that relationship 5 holds at k(s) = 0 and
 relationship 6 holds at k(s) = n.
 We now turn to the question of when the explicit as
 well as implicit assumptions of the Condorcet Jury
 Theorem are satisfied in model I. Note first that the
 probability that i votes correctly, given that her strategy
 is informative, is simply
 pi Pr[si = O[A]Pr[A] + Pr[si = 1IB]Pr[B]
 =rqa + (1 - r)qb >1/2, all i E N, (8)
 while the probability that any pair of individuals (i, j)
 both vote correctly is given by
 rij Pr[si = 0 and sj = O[A]Pr[A]
 + Pr[si = 1 and sj = 1IB]Pr[B]
 =7rq2 + (1 - r)q2 (9)
 (Because pi and r.. are identical across all i, j (i * j),
 hereafter we write p =pi and r- ri.) Now suppose qa
 = qb = q; that is, the probability that si = 0 when the
 true state is A is the same as the probability si = 1 when
 the true state is B (this will be relaxed later). Under this
 assumption, if individuals' voting strategies are informa-
 tive then the probability that individual i votes correctly
 is independent from that of voterj:p = iT + (1 -12 )T
 =q and, therefore, r = irq2 + (1 - r)q =q = p
 LEMMA 1. Assume qa = qb. Then sincere voting in model I
 is informative if and only if k* = (n - 1)12.
 Proof. Assume qa = qb = q. By relationships 3 and 4, if
 sincere voting is informative, then
 q/(l -q) > 1_ > (1- q~lq (10)
 37
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 (or, equivalently, q > nr > 1 - q). Now set qj = qb =
 q in relationship 7 and collect terms to yield k* implicitly
 defined as the integer such that
 [qI(l - q)]2(k*?l)n > iI > [ q( 1 -q)/q]n2k* (11)
 Since qI(l - q) > IT/(l - IT) by relationship 10,
 [ql(1 - q)]2(k*?> > - IT
 implies k* (n - 1)/2; and similarly, since relationship
 10 requires
 IT/(l - n) > (1 - q)lq, 1 > [(1 - q)lq]
 implies k* ? (n - 1)/2. Therefore, if sincere voting is
 informative at (q, qb, I) when qj = qb, k* = (n -
 1)/2 necessarily. To check sufficiency, substitute (n -
 1)/2 for k* in relationship 11 to yield relationship 10
 and, by relationships 3 and 4, note that relationship 10
 implies sincere voting is informative. Q.E.D.
 Therefore if qa = qb the only time sincere voting will be
 informative is when the optimal decision rule (i.e., the
 optimal way to aggregate individuals' information) is
 majority rule.
 Lemma 1 states precisely when informative voting is
 sincere. The next result states precisely when informa-
 tive voting is rational.
 LEMMA 2. For all (qa, qb) E (1/2, 1)2 informative voting
 in model I is rational if and only if the aggregation rule
 f is such that kf = k*.
 Necessity Proof. Suppose instead that kf * k*, where
 without loss of generality k* < kf. Consider the decision
 by individual i when all other individuals are voting
 informatively; if we can show that i does not want to vote
 informatively, then we will be done. The only time i is
 pivotal (i.e., the only time i's vote makes a difference in
 the collective decision) is when B receives exactly kf
 votes. Assuming all other individuals are voting infor-
 matively, this only occurs when exactly kf of the individ-
 uals other than i have observed is. But then given k* <
 kf, the optimal decision is to select alternative B regard-
 less of i's signal, and therefore i's best response is vi(si)
 = B for si = 0 and s, = 1; that is, i's best response is not
 to vote informatively.
 Sufficiency Proof. Employing the same logic, if kf = k*,
 all other individuals are voting informatively and i is
 pivotal, then exactly k* of the other individuals must
 have observed is. Thus if si = 1 then the optimal
 decision is to select B, so that i should vote for B,
 whereas if si = 0, the optimal decision isA, and i should
 vote forA. Hence i's best response to informative voting
 by the others is also to vote informatively, and informa-
 tive voting constitutes a Nash equilibrium. Q.E.D.
 Combining these two results, we get the following.
 THEOREM 1. Assume q, = qh, then sincere voting in model
 I is informative and rational if and only if kf = k* =
 (n - 1)/2.
 38
 That is, sincere voting is both informative and rational
 precisely when (a) majority rule is being used to aggre-
 gate individuals' votes and (b) majority rule is the
 optimal method of aggregating individuals' information.
 As a corollary, we can identify when the parameters of
 the model (q, i) are such that the implicit, as well as
 explicit, assumptions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem
 hold: Under majority rule sincere voting is both infor-
 mative and rational when k* = (n - 1)/2, that is, when
 majority rule is the optimal method of aggregating
 individuals' information.7 For example, if ir = 1/2, then
 k* = (n - 1)/2 and hence, given a uniform prior,
 sincere voting will be both informative and rational
 under majority rule.
 Conversely, whenever it is the case that k* does not
 equal (n - 1)/2, one of the explicit or implicit assump-
 tions of the Jury Theorem must be violated. In particu-
 lar, we know that sincere voting is not informative when
 k* * (n - 1)/2 (by Lemma 1) and so, even if sincere
 voting is rational, the probability that a majority makes a
 correct decision will be exactly the same as that of any
 individual (since sincere voting in this case requires
 voting for either A or B regardless of the private
 information). And if sincere voting is not rational, then
 the implicit behavioral assumption in the proofs of the
 Jury Theorem is inconsistent with Nash equilibrium
 behavior. On the other hand, if we ignore this behavioral
 assumption, for any value of k* (or, more properly, for
 any values of (q, r)), there will exist a voting rule for
 which the conclusion of the Jury Theorem (i.e., that the
 collective performs better than any individual) is true.
 The identity of this voting rule follows immediately from
 lemma 2: Whatever the value of k*, set kf = k*. Then
 informative voting will be rational and-by definition of
 k* and the fact that there is more than one individual
 (so the collective has strictly more draws than does an
 individual)-the probability that the collective makes a
 correct decision is strictly higher than that of any one
 individual. Thus an alternative view of the Condorcet
 Jury Theorem, from the perspective of model I, is this:
 For any value of k * there exists a voting rule that the
 Jury Theorem conclusion obtains; and majority rule is
 that rule precisely when k* = (n - 1)/2, that is, when
 majority rule is the optimal method of aggregating the
 individuals' private information.
 The symmetry assumption on qa and qb found in
 Theorem 1 is very special. For the Jury Theorem to say
 anything more than that majority voting aggregates
 information effectively when majority voting is the opti-
 mal way to aggregate information, it must apply in
 situations in which the latter is not the case. And by the
 preceding argument, this necessarily involves qa * qb.
 Unfortunately, under such circumstances, the theorem
 cannot generally assume that individuals are rational. To
 see this, recall that the original statement of the Con-
 dorcet Jury Theorem presumes that the probability that
 any individual votes for the better alternative is statisti-
 cally independent of the same probability for any other
 7 Of course, the converse of this statement also holds: If k* = (n -
 1)/2, then sincere voting is informative and rational if and only if f is
 majority rule.
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 individual. However, when qa does not equal qb, there is
 necessarily some amount of correlation between these
 probabilities (see relationship 9). But independence is
 only a sufficient condition. Ladha (1992) provides the
 following upper bound on the correlation r, denoted *,
 for the Jury Theorem to apply:
 n i-p
 r np- p (P- .25). (12)
 That is, if the average correlation between the likeli-
 hoods of any two individuals (sincerely) voting for the
 correct alternative is less than P, then the Condorcet Jury
 Theorem goes through. Now consider the following
 example:
 Example1.LetN={1,...,21},qa=.7,qb=.8,and
 IT = .5. Making the appropriate substitutions, we
 calculate
 i. from relationships 3 and 4, that sincere voting is
 informative
 ii. from relationships 8 and 9, that p = .75 and r =
 .565
 iii. from relationship 12, that r = .575
 iv. from relationship 7, that k* = (n + 1)/2.
 By Ladha 1992, proposition 1, properties i-iii imply that
 the Jury Theorem applies to this case. But by property iv
 and Lemma 2 (which does not require qa = qb),
 informative-and hence sincere-voting under majority
 rule is not rational here.
 ADDING DIVERSITY
 In the model of the previous section, each individual was
 one of only two possible "types" following their private
 observations: those who believed A was the more likely
 state (relative to the prior) and those who believed B
 was the more likely state. These types then correspond
 to the two different posterior beliefs the individuals
 might hold. We shall modify the basic setup to allow for
 a third type to exist as well, namely, those whose
 posterior belief turns out to be "in the middle" of the
 first two. We do this by assuming that individuals
 observe not one draw from the true distribution but
 rather two. Thus a private signal is now a pair si = (sil
 Si2) E {O, 1}2 describing the observations of two
 independent draws from the true distribution found in
 relationship 2, and so an individual's strategy is now a
 mapping vi: {O, 1}2 {A, B}. (As before, v( ) will
 denote a voting profile.) Further, we make the symmetry
 assumption that qa = qb q, where q E (1/2, 1).
 Finally, we let the prior uT on state A take on any value
 except 1/2 (the importance of this last assumption will
 become apparent) and restrict attention only to the
 majority aggregation rule. Together we refer to these
 assumptions as model II.
 The definition of sincere voting is just as before,
 namely, that an individual chooses alternative A or B
 depending on which is the more likely state based on her
 private information. Since an individual's two draws are
 assumed to be independent, sincere voting can, without
 loss of generality, be written as a function of the number
 of is observed, so let Si = sil + Si2 and redefine vi: {O,
 1, 2} -> {A, B}. Further, since qa = qb, it is immediate
 from Bayes' Rule that the posterior belief associated
 with Si = 1 is simply equal to the prior belief ir.
 Therefore, sincere voting upon observing Si = 1 pre-
 scribes voting for A if ir > 1/2 and voting for B if rr <
 1/2.8 For Si E {O, 2}, sincere voting is determined by
 the following inequalities, which are analogous to those
 found in relationships 3 and 4:
 E[ui(A, * )ISi = 0] > E[ui(B, )ISi = 0]
 -- -1q-q 2
 w 1 >- fl q (13)
 E[ui(B, * )ISi = 2] > E[ui(A, * )S = 2]
 qT 2
 <1-s< ~ l-q * (14)
 Two comments on these equations are in order. First,
 since q > 1/2, one of the relationships 13 and 14 must
 always hold: if 'r > 1/2 then necessarily relationship 13 is
 true, whereas if ir < 1/2, then necessarily relationship 14
 is true. Second, if relationship 13 holds but relationship
 14 does not, then it must be that sincere individuals vote
 for alternative A regardless of their private informa-
 tion-and similarly for B if relationship 14 holds but
 relationship 13 does not. As previously, such behavior
 immediately implies that the Jury Theorem will not hold
 if all vote sincerely, because a majority decision is no
 more likely to be correct -than any individual's decision.
 We thus have the following generalization of the earlier
 definition of an informative strategy:
 DEFINITION. A voting strategy vi is informative if vi(O) = A
 and vi(2) = B.
 Thus sincere voting will be informative if and only if both
 relationships 13 and 14 hold.
 Finally, as before, we will say that a voting profile
 is rational if it constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the
 Bayesian game associated with model II. Again, the
 crucial distinction between sincere and rational voting
 will be due to the additional "equilibrium" information
 associated with the latter.
 In model I we saw how sincere voting under majority
 rule can be both informative and rational in certain
 situations, namely, when majority rule was the optimal
 method of aggregating information. The following result
 states that no such conditions exist in model II.
 THEOREM 2. Sincere voting in model II cannot be both
 informative and rational.
 Proof. Suppose all i ] j vote sincerely and informatively,
 Sj = 1, and j is pivotal. Without loss of generality, let
 ir < 1/2; thus a sincere vote byj would be to choose B.
 Sincef is majority rule andj is presumed pivotal, she can
 infer that exactly (n - 1)/2 individuals have Si = 0. Let
 d (n - 1)/2 and let i(s) denote the event {Sj = 1,
 8 Hence, assuming -rr + 1/2 ensures that individuals with S1 = 1 are not
 indifferent.
 39
This content downloaded from 131.215.70.231 on Fri, 18 Mar 2016 21:05:57 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Rationality and the Condorcet Jury Theorem March 1996
 I{i E N\{j}: Si = ?}| = d}. The expected utility,
 conditional on W (s), forj of alternative A being selected
 is equal to the probability A is the true state conditional
 on W (s)-and similarly for B. Using Bayes' Rule and the
 Binomial Theorem, we have
 x y
 E[uj(A, * Ace(5)] = X+ Y, E[uj(B, * AW(5)] = X + Y
 where
 X= wT(l - q,)q( 2d q2d
 \d 1q
 X | (j) (2q(1 - q))di(l - q)21}
 Y= (1 - n)q(1 - q) d (1 - q)2d
 X {5 (2 j)(2q(1 - q))d-jq2j
 Therefore E[uj(A, * )1C6(s)] > t[uj(B, * )jW(s)] if and
 only if
 q)q d q 2d | ( '2q(1 - q) )d1l(1 -q) i
 > n1_ )q(l - q) 2d ) lq)2di (
 x (2q(1 - q) )diq2} 2 i (2 ) (2q(l - q))d-j
 X ['r(l - q)21q2d - (1 - u)q21(l - q)2d] > 0.
 Since q > 1/2 and relationship 13 holds,
 Vj = 0O ... , d - 1,
 [IT(l - q)21q2d - (1 - u)q21(l - q)2d] > 0.
 Therefore all but the last bracketed term in this summa-
 tion is positive, whereas the last term is negative. More-
 over, considering only the first and last terms in the
 summation, we have
 (d)(2q(1 - q))d[ q2d - (1 - n)(1 - q)2d]
 + (d)[1(q(1 -q))2 - (1 - n)(q(l - q))2d]
 > 1[,7q2d - (1 - T)(1 - q)2d] + [,iT(q(l - q)d
 (1 - T)(q(l -q) )d]} [q(l - q) ]d
 = {7qd[qd + (1 - q)d] - (1 - IT)(l - q)d[qd
 + (1 -q)d]}[q(1 rq)]d > -qd(d)(- d
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 where the last inequality holds by relationship 13, q >
 1/2, and the fact that n - 5 implies d ? 2. Hence,
 E[uj(A, * )j1(s)] > E[uj(B, * )1%(s)], and therefore,
 conditional on being pivotal, j's best response is A; that
 is, if everyone else is voting sincerely, then j should not
 vote sincerely. Q.E.D.
 Thus in model II sincere voting by all individuals is
 either uninformative (i.e., everyone votes for A or B
 independent of their private information), so that the
 conclusion of the Condorcet Jury Theorem that majority
 voting does strictly better than any one individual does
 not hold, or is not rational, in which case an implicit
 assumption of the theorem (i.e., that all individuals vote
 sincerely in collective decision making) prescribes irra-
 tional behavior.
 Intuitively, it is apparent where the "problem" with
 the Jury Theorem lies in model II, in contrast to model
 I. In the former, there are now three possible "types" of
 voters (i.e., three possible posterior beliefs they could
 have), yet there are only two possible decisions, "vote for
 A" or "vote for B." Thus assuming sincere and infor-
 mative voting, and uT < 1/2, only one type (Si = 0) votes
 forA, so that the private information possessed by those
 voting for A can be precisely inferred, whereas the
 remaining two types (Si = 1 or 2) vote for B, thereby not
 allowing such a precise inference. This is in contrast to
 the informative voting found in model I, where such
 precise inferences always obtain. The problem, there-
 fore, reduces to one of the "size of the message space,"
 in that under a more complicated aggregation rule,
 individuals might simply announce their private infor-
 mation or (equivalently) announce their posterior be-
 liefs.
 This distinction between sincere and rational voting is
 to a certain degree reminiscent of that found in the
 complete-information voting literature. If, for example,
 individuals first vote on alternative x versus y, and then
 the winner of this contest is pitted against alternative z,
 then depending on the individual preferences one can
 have instances where sincere voting under majority rule
 is distinct from (and generates different outcomes from)
 rational or "sophisticated" voting. Such examples re-
 quire at least three alternatives as well as a certain
 amount of heterogeneity in individual preferences. By
 contrast, in models I and II sincere and rational voting
 can differ when there are only two alternatives and
 where the ex ante and ex post preferences of the
 individuals are the same. As remarked in the introduc-
 tion, the wedge between sincere and rational voting here
 rests on private information leading to heterogeneity in
 individuals' interim policy preferences, and such hetero-
 geneity permits individuals to make inferences about the
 general distribution of private information in equilib-
 rium.
 Theorem 2 states that when relationships 13 and 14
 hold, sincere voting does not constitute a Nash equilib-
 rium of the Bayesian game associated with model II.
 This leaves open the question, What are the equilibria?
 Two candidates immediately come to mind, namely,
 everyone voting for A regardless of their private infor-
 mation and, similarly, everyone voting for B. As with
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 most majority-rule voting games, either of these voting
 profiles is evidently a Nash equilibrium, because if
 everyone is (say) voting for A, then any one individual's
 vote is immaterial, so that voting for A regardless of
 private information is a best response. Now in complete-
 information voting games, these "trivial" equilibria are
 eliminated by requiring individual strategies to be un-
 dominated. Thus, if individual j prefers A to B, then
 voting for B is dominated. On the other hand, in the
 current incomplete-information voting game, such a
 refinement argument does not work. To see this, let d =
 (n - 1)/2, and have d individuals play the strategy
 "always vote for B" and d individuals play the strategy
 vi(Si) = A if and only if Si = 0. What is individual ]'s
 best response? Just as in the Nash calculations found in
 the proof of Theorem 2, j only need consider when she
 is pivotal; further, if one can show that a best response
 for j when Si = 2 is to choose A, then A will be the best
 response for Sj s 1 as well. So suppose S j= 2, and j is
 pivotal; then according to the others' strategies, it must
 be that the latter group of d individuals must all have
 private signals of Si = 0, whereas j cannot make any
 inference about the former group's private information.
 Therefore, employing Bayes' Rule, we get that voting for
 A will be the better response as long as
 ,u(l - q)2qud > (1 - uT)q 2(1 - q)2d
 Tr- 1 - q2d-2
 r~~~1 -1Ts q
 where the latter inequality follows from q > 1/2, d - 2,
 and relationship 13. Therefore everyone voting for A
 regardless of their private information constitutes- an
 undominated Nash equilibrium, and a similar logic
 shows the same to be true with respect to B.
 What is most striking about these Nash equilibria is
 that they actually reverse the conclusion of the Condorcet
 Jury Theorem-that is, any one individual, acting alone
 (i.e. voting sincerely) will have a higher probability of
 making a correct decision than will a majority acting in
 accordance with one of these Nash equilibria. This
 follows from the fact that a sincere strategy maximizes
 the probability that a single individual makes a correct
 choice, and by relationships 13 and 14, such a maximiz-
 ing strategy will depend nontrivially on the private
 information, in contrast to the "always vote A (or B)"
 strategy.9
 Finally, Theorem 2 leaves open the possibility that
 whenever sincere voting is not rational, the Condorcet
 Jury Theorem fails to apply because the relevant corre-
 lations between individuals' likelihoods of voting cor-
 rectly, when they vote sincerely, are too high. Were this
 invariably the case, Theorem 2 would not bear on the
 Jury Theorem directly. However this is not the case, as
 Example 2 below aptly demonstrates.
 9 Of course, other equilibria involving mixed or asymmetric strategies
 might leave the conclusion of the theorem intact. But then a complete
 explanation for why majorities are more likely to choose the "better"
 alternative than any individual requires some sort of equilibrium
 selection argument.
 Example 2. Let N = { 1, .. ., 21}, q = .9, and 1T = .6.
 Then since p = T[q2 + 2q(1 - q)] + (1 - iT)q2 and
 r = 1T[q4 + 4(1 - q)3q + 4q2(1 - q)2] + (1 - qT)q4,
 we have
 i. Informative voting is sincere
 ii. p = .918, and r = .8505
 iii. r= .8554.
 Thus, just as with Example 1, there exist environments
 where all of the explicit assumptions of the Jury Theo-
 rem are met, yet by Theorem 2 the implicit assumption
 of sincere voting prescribes irrational behavior.
 A MODEL WITH PUBLIC AND
 PRIVATE SIGNALS
 We have found existing proofs of the Condorcet Jury
 Theorem to be applicable and consistent with rational
 voting only in those circumstances in which majority
 voting is ex ante the optimal method for aggregating
 information. However, the results are derived in a model
 without public signals, whereas, typically there are public
 signals. For instance, "opinion leaders," the media, or
 acts of nature can be commonly observed and lead
 people to update their beliefs about the true state of the
 world. Hence, we shall extend the model to include a
 public signal and argue that in this setting, the consis-
 tency of the Jury Theorem with rational behavior breaks
 down in a similar fashion to that seen in the previous
 section.
 In model III, the source and structure of an individ-
 ual's private information is as in model II: two indepen-
 dent draws, where qa = qb = q E (1/2, 1). Therefore,
 there are again three types of individuals, depending on
 their private information (or, equivalently, on their
 posterior beliefs). In addition, we assume for analytic
 simplicity that the prior wr is equal to 1/2. Now, however,
 subsequent to observing their private draws but before
 voting on the two alternatives, all individuals observe
 one public draw sp E {O, 1}. A voting strategy is now a
 mapping vi: {0, 1}3 -* {A, B}, with again v(*)
 denoting a voting profile.
 We allow this public signal to differ in its "informa-
 tional content" from that of individuals' private signals,
 by assuming
 Pr[sp = 0A] = Q = Pr[sp = 1IB], Q E (1/2, 1).
 That is, private and public signals can be drawn from
 different (state-dependent) distributions.
 As before, sincere voting describes an individual's
 optimal voting decision based solely on her own private
 information, as well as (here) on the public information
 associated with the value of s . As in model II, for such
 behavior we can characterize an individual's private
 information by Si = sil + Si2, and then define a sincere
 strategy as a map from {0, 1, 2} X {O, 1} into {A, B}.
 Employing Bayes' Rule (and recalling that wT is set equal
 to 1/2 and Q > 1/2), we know that if Si = 1, then
 sincere voting prescribes voting in accordance with the
 public signal, that is, for A if sp, = 0 and for B if sp, = 1.
 Likewise, if Si = 0 and sp = 0, sincere voting would
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 select A, whereas if Si = 2 and sp = 1, sincere voting
 would select B. The remaining cases are when Si = 0
 and sp = 1, and when Si = 2 and sp = 0, that is, where
 there is a certain amount of conflict in an individual's
 private and public signals. In these two cases, by the
 various symmetry assumptions (i.e., qa = qb, iT = 1/2),
 we have
 E[ui(A, * )ISi = 0, sp = 1] > E[ui(B, * )ISi = O.
 sp = 1] <q2(1 - Q) > (1 - q)2Q<*E[ui(B, * )ISi = 2,
 sp = 0] > E[ui(A, * )ISi = 2, sp = 0] (15)
 If the inequalities do not hold, then sincere voting would
 have the individuals ignoring their private information
 and simply choosing between A and B based on the
 realization of the public draw. As previously, such a
 situation would render the probability of a correct
 majority decision under sincere voting equal to that of a
 correct individual decision. Therefore we again require
 the voting strategies to be informative:
 DEFINITION. A voting strategy in model III is informative if
 vi(O, 1) = A and vi(2, 0) = B.
 From relationship 15, we have that sincere voting is
 informative if and only if q2(1 - Q) > (1 - q)2Q; that
 is, the public signal cannot be "too" informative relative
 to the private signals.
 As before, we say that a voting profile is rational if it
 constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the Bayesian game
 associated with model III.
 THEOREM 3. Sincere voting in model III cannot be both
 informative and rational.
 Proof. The proof is almost identical to that for Theorem
 2. Suppose all i * j vote sincerely and informatively,
 Sj = 1, and j is pivotal; without loss of generality, let sp
 = 1. Since f is majority rule and j is presumed pivotal, j
 can infer that exactly (n - 1)/2 individuals other than]
 have Si = 0. Let d (n - 1)/2 and let W (s) denote the
 event, {S- = 1, sp =1, I{i E N\fj}: Si = O} I = d}. The
 expected utility, conditional on W (s), for], of alternative
 A being selected is equal to the probability A is the true
 state conditional on W (s)-and similarly for B. Using
 Bayes' Rule and the Binomial Theorem,
 E [uj(A, * )|%(s) ] > E [uj(B, * )|%W(s)]
 Q q(1 - q)(1 - Q)( d )q2d
 X E (j )(2q(1 - q))d-i(1 - q)}2j
 >q(1 -q)Q( d )(1 -q)2
 X E (2 )(2q(1 - q))d-jq2j}
 4=d
 42 -I/
 - Qq2'(l - q)2d] > 0.
 Since q > 1/2 and relationship 15 holds,
 Vj = O,... ,d - 1,
 [(1 - Q)(1 - q)2-q' - Qq2'(1 - q)'] > 0.
 Thus all but the last terms in the above summation are
 positive, while the last term is negative. Moreover,
 considering only the first and last terms in the summa-
 tion, we have
 (d)(2q(1 - q))d[(l - Q)q2d - Q(1 - q)2d]
 + (d) [(1 - Q)(q(l - q))- Q(q(l - q))d]
 > 1[('I - Q)q' - Q(1 - q)2d]
 + [(1 - Q)(q(l - q))d - Q(q(l - q))d]}[q(l - q)]d
 {(1 - Q)qd[qd + (1 -q)d]
 - Q(1 -q)d[qd + (1 -q)d]}[q(l - q)]d > 0
 <* (1 - Q)q d > Q(1 - q)d,
 where the last inequality holds by relationship 15, q >
 1/2, and the fact that n ' 5 implies d - 2. Hence,
 E[uj(A, * )1|6(s)] > E[uj(B, * ) W(s)], and therefore,
 conditional on being pivotal, j's best response is A; that
 is, if everyone else is voting sincerely, then j should not
 vote sincerely. Q.E.D.
 A number of remarks about this result are in order. The
 proof demonstrated that those individuals whose private
 signals were split (i.e., one 0 and one 1) vote against the
 public signal if all others are voting sincerely. If we
 assume that n ' 9, then the same logic yields the same
 result when an individual's private signal is perfectly
 consistent with the public signal: if j privately observes
 two is, the public signal is 1, and all other individuals
 vote sincerely, then j's best response is to vote for A,
 rather than the sincere choice of B.
 Second, the result does not rely critically on the
 assumption that uT = 1/2, that is, each state is equally
 likely ex ante. Setting uT equal to 1/2 merely allowed us to
 cancel terms that would be close as long as IT was close
 to 1/2. Hence, as long as the ex ante likelihood of the
 states are sufficiently close, the result remains the same.
 Finally, the assumption that there is only a single
 public signal is not important either. Suppose instead
 that there were m public draws, were m is greater than
 1 and odd and suppose these consisted of (m + 1)/2 Os
 and (m - 1)/2 is. Then, given our symmetry assump-
 tions, Bayesian updating reveals that this generates the
 same posterior belief as having observed one 0 and no ls
 (recall the equivalence of relationships 7 and 10 when
 qa= qb). So, upon observing such public draws, sincere
 voting will not be rational. A single public signal, there-
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 fore, is used only for emphasis, because in such an
 environment sincere voting is not rational regardless of
 the public draw.
 As before, Theorem 3 raises the question, What are
 the Nash equilibria? One possibility is that the individ-
 uals ignore the public signal and vote solely on the
 information contained in their private signal. However,
 it is apparent that for any value of wr other than 1/2, such
 behavior is equivalent to that discussed previously, and
 therefore sincere voting based only on private informa-
 tion is not a Nash equilibrium. Conversely, ignoring all
 private information and voting exclusively on the basis of
 the public signal is clearly a Nash equilibrium. More-
 over, such behavior is undominated. To see this, suppose
 that if the public signal is 0, the first d (n - 1)/2
 individuals vote for A regardless of their private infor-
 mation, and the next d vote for B if and only if their
 private information is Si = 2; and if the public signal is
 1, the first d individuals vote for B regardless of their
 private information and the next d vote forA if and only
 if Si = 0. What is individual n's best response when the
 public signal is, say, 1? Just as in the Nash calculations
 found in the proof of Theorem 3, individual n only needs
 consider when she is pivotal. Further, if we can show that
 n's best response when Sn = 0 is to choose B, then B will
 be the best response for Sn : 1 as well, thereby
 demonstrating the claim. Making the relevant calcula-
 tions, we find
 E[un,(B, * )I - ] > E[Un(A, * I
 > (1 - q)2Qqn-1 > q2(1 - Q)(1 -q)n-1
 Q _q n-3
 Because Q > 1/2, q > 1/2, and n > 5, this inequality
 necessarily holds.
 Theorem 3 leaves open the possibility that whenever
 rational voting is not sincere, the Condorcet Jury The-
 orem fails to apply because the relevant correlations
 between individuals' likelihoods of voting correctly,
 when they vote sincerely, are too high. Just as with
 Theorem 2, however, we provide an example to show
 that this is not invariably the case:
 Example 3. Let N = {1, . . ., 21 }, q = Q = .9 andnT =
 .5. Then the sincere voting rule is informative, and we
 calculate:
 i. p = q3 + 3q2(1 - q) = .972
 ii. r = (1 - q)q4 + q[4q2(1 - q)2 + q4 + 4q3(1 -
 q)] = .9472
 iii. r = .9502 (from relationship 12).
 Once more, i-iii imply the Jury Theorem goes through
 assuming that all individuals vote sincerely (Ladha
 1992). But by Theorem 3, sincere voting here is not
 rational.
 SUMMARY AND IMPLICATION
 The Condorcet Jury Theorem and its extensions assert
 that under certain conditions, the probability that a
 collective chooses the correct alternative by majority
 vote exceeds the probability that any constituent mem-
 ber of the collective would unilaterally choose that
 alternative. Implicit in these conditions is the assump-
 tion that individuals behave in the collective decision
 exactly as they would if choosing alone (and that such
 voting is informative). The intuition that an assumption
 of "sincere" voting is innocuous here turns out to be
 faulty. Although there is certainly no incentive or oppor-
 tunity for individual gain at the expense of others, it does
 not follow that rational individuals behave identically in
 collective and in autarkic decision-making environ-
 ments.
 We have looked at the role of the "sincerity" assump-
 tion in the Jury Theorems with three variations of an
 extremely simple model, each of which differs from the
 others only in the specification of individuals' informa-
 tion. And in each case, the model is set up so that the
 features of the Jury Theorems typically taken as primi-
 tive (e.g., individuals' probability assessments on which
 alternative is best, the correlation between such assess-
 ments) are generated both endogenously within the
 model and consistent with the parametric restrictions
 imposed by the Jury Theorems per se. In only one
 circumstance is it the case that sincere voting is infor-
 mative and rational. In model I, where individuals'
 information consists of a single independent and private
 draw from a state-dependent distribution, the Condorcet
 Jury Theorem obtains when and only when majority
 voting is the optimal way to aggregate individuals'
 private information. Moreover, if majority voting is not
 the optimal way to aggregate information, then sincere
 voting under majority rule cannot be rational. In partic-
 ular, we provide an example in which the explicit as-
 sumptions of the Jury Theorem hold yet sincere voting is
 not rational. Indeed, when all other individuals are
 voting sincerely, any one individual has an incentive to
 vote against the advice of her private information.
 Within model I, therefore, the Condorcet Jury Theorem
 as usually formulated is either trivial or necessarily
 precludes Nash equilibrium behavior.
 The situation is more stark in model II, where indi-
 viduals' information comprises two independent draws
 from a state-dependent distribution, and model III,
 where individuals' model II information is augmented by
 a public signal from some (possibly) distinct state-
 dependent distribution. In both these environments we
 prove that sincere voting cannot be both informative and
 rational. Moreover, in both models II and III, all indi-
 viduals voting for the same alternative irrespective of
 their information is an undominated Nash equilibrium.
 With respect to the probability of selecting the correct
 alternative, that is, majority voting can easily do worse
 than any individual acting alone (and this is true even
 when the parametric conditions for the Jury Theorem to
 hold are satisfied).
 Two immediate implications follow from these results.
 The first is that ignoring the sources of information that
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 support individuals' beliefs precludes analysis of individ-
 ually rational behavior. And if the objective of the
 analysis is to understand how people behave under
 specific institutional constraints, this is clearly undesir-
 able. Second, the appropriateness of majority rule (or,
 for that matter, any voting rule) in generating "good"
 collective outcomes will depend on the details of the
 situation of concern. For example, as was illustrated in
 model I, the identity of the optimal voting rule hinged
 critically on parameters governing individuals' informa-
 tion.
 More generally, our results reveal the importance of
 addressing issues in collective decision making from a
 game-theoretic perspective. In particular, the appropri-
 ate approach to problems of information aggregation is
 through game theory and mechanism design, not statis-
 tics.
 APPENDIX
 Here we describe in detail the Bayesian game played by the individuals
 in models I and II, as well as the Nash equilibrium conditions; the
 description for model III is similar. Each individual has a set of types
 Ti, where in model I this set is equal to {O, 1} whereas in model II it
 is {O, 1}2; let
 T= X TiandT-= X Tp.
 iEN j~i
 A type profile t = (t. tJ) E T is drawn according to the priorp(t)
 over T, where this prior is given byp(t) = lrPr[tA] + (1 - nr)Pr[ttB],
 and where Pr[tI] and Pr[tIB] are determined by relationship 2 and
 the presumed independence of the individual draws.
 Let {A, B} = Di be the set of decisions available to individual i and
 let
 D = X Di.
 iEN
 Prior to making her decision, i observes her component t1 of the type
 profile t. Thus, a strategy for i is a function vi: Ti -* Di, where we let
 v: T -* D denote a strategy profile; throughout, v(t -) will denote the
 vector of decisions by all individuals except i according to the strategy
 profile v( * ).
 From relationship 1 we can define preferences over vectors of
 decisions, d, and type profiles, t, in the following manner (for
 simplicity, we assume majority rule): Let M(d) = A if I{i E N: di =
 A } I > n/2 and M(d) = B otherwise (recall n is assumed odd). Then
 we have
 u(d, t) = Pr[M(d)lt] = Pr[M(d) & t] (A-1)
 p(t)
 That is, the expected utility from (say) a majority selecting outcome A
 given the vector of types t is equal to the probability that A is the true
 state conditional on t, which by Bayes' Rule is given by the probability
 the state is A and the type profile t is observed divided by the
 probability that t is observed.
 Upon observing ti, individual i updates her belief about others' types
 in a Bayesian fashion:
 = p(t)
 Ptili P(ti, tJi (A-2)
 The expected utility from voting for di E D,, given the updated belief
 p(t1Ilti) and the strategies of the others v(t1i) is given by
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 T-i
 DEFINITION.A (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium of the above Bayesian game
 is a strategy profile v*( * ) such that for all i E N and all tj E Ti, v *(t)
 = A only if EU(A; ti, v*) - EU(B; ti, v*) 0 O.
 It turns out that we can simplify significantly the inequality found in
 this definition. By relationships A-1 and A-2, we know that
 1
 EU(di; ti, v) {E p(t-i, ti Pr[M(di, v(t-i)) and t]}. (A-3)
 T .~~~~-
 More important, because only the sign of the difference in the expected
 utility in voting for A and B is relevant, we can ignore the denominator
 in relationship A-3 and write
 EU(A; ti, v) - EU(B; ti, v)xC {Pr[M(A, v(tj)) and t]
 T-i
 - Pr[M(B, v(t-i)) and t]} (A-4)
 (where x means "is proportional to"). Now define
 Tpi(v) = {ti E Tj i{ j M N\{i}: vj(tj) = A}I} = (n - 1)/2}.
 TPi(v) thus gives those type subprofiles where, according to the
 strategy v, exactly half of the remaining individuals (i.e., all but i) vote
 forA. Thus, when ti E T'Pi(v), voter i will be pivotal, so that for these
 subprofiles M(di, v(t-i)) = di, whereas for t-i 0 TPi(v) i is not
 pivotal, so that the bracketed term in the summation on the right-hand
 side of relationship A-4 will be zero. Therefore, we can replace
 relationship A-4 with
 EU(A; ti, v) - EU(B; ti, v)
 xc E {Pr[A and t] - Pr[B and t]}
 TP.(v)
 - E {rrPr[tLA] - (1 - ir)Pr[tIB]}. (A-5)
 TP.(v)t
 It is relationship A-5, then, which is employed to determine when
 sincere voting does or does not constitute a Nash equilibrium. Fur-
 ther, the "equilibrium" restriction to only those type subprofiles in
 T.Pi(v) is the source of the additional information alluded to in the
 text.
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